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Towards A Model Penal Code, Second
(Federal?): The Challenge of the Special
Part
Gerard E. Lynch*
The Model Penal Code is among the most successful academic law reform projects ever attempted. In
the first two decades after its completion in 1962,
more than two-thirds of the states undertook to enact
new codifications of their criminal law, and virtually
all of those used the Model Penal Code as a starting
point.1 The Model Penal Code was influential in a variety of different ways. First, the very notion of a systematic codification of criminal law received a dramatic boost from the Model Penal Code. Apart from
the degree to which any particular state recodification
resembled the Model Penal Code, the Code provided
the impetus for undertaking new codifications in the
first place, where many jurisdictions had previously
been content with relatively loosely organized compilations of the accumulated criminal statutes passed
over the years, many of which simply embodied or assumed traditional common law rules. Second, the
specific form of codification developed in the Model
Penal Code was powerfully influential. The new state
codes typically followed the Model Penal Code's strategy of beginning with sections that combined definitional functions with presumptive rules addressing
the "general part" of the criminal law, followed by
specific statutes defining particular crimes. Third, the
particular resolutions for specific traditional criminal
law issues adopted by the Model Penal Code were often quite influential. Although some of the Code's
*

Paul J. Kellner Professor of Law, Columbia University School of

Law
1. See Herbert Wechsler, Forward to Model Penal Code and Commentaries at xi (The American Law Institute 1985).
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formulations (e.g., the modified felony-murder
"presumption"2 ) found few followers, many others
were broadly adopted either in state codes (e.g., the
definitions of mental culpability terms3 ), in judicial
elaboration of common law standards or non-Code
statutes (e.g., the widespread use of the "substantial
step" test in federal court definitions of attempt) or
even in constitutional law (e.g., the Supreme Court's
near-incorporation of the Model Penal Code standard
for use of deadly force in making an arrest into the
Fourth Amendment definition of a "reasonable" seizure of the person).
Now, as we celebrate the 35th anniversary of the
final promulgation of the Model Penal Code, the wave
of codifications stimulated by the Code has long since
crested. But the Code's influence lives on. Most
American law students who study substantive criminal law learn it in a course that places heavy emphasis on the Code as a teaching tool and as the most enlightened single embodiment of the common law
approach to the subject. Courts continue to refer to the
Model Penal Code and its commentaries as persuasive
authority. And the principled but utilitarian approach
that underlies the Code's solutions dominates the
thinking of judges as they try to make sense of the
many issues presented in determining the boundaries
of criminal law.
I think it is fair to say, however, that the continuing influence of the Model Penal Code today is far
greater with respect to the "general part" of the criminal law than with regard to the "special part." Within
the codes that were adopted under the Model Penal
Code's influence in the 1960s and 1970s, legislatures
2. Model Penal Code § 210.2(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
3. Id. § 2.02.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 66 (2d Cir. 1983). Cf.
Model Penal Code § 5.01(1)(c).
5. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). Cf. Model Penal
Code § 3.07(2)(b).
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have made relatively few changes in the sections embodying general principles of law or interpretive rules.
Courts continue to cite the Model Penal Code on the
definition of attempt, the nature of justification, or the
relevance of mistake. Because the spirit of the times is
more vindictive and less liberal than that of the period
in which the Model Penal Code was drafted, courts
and legislatures may take a more conservative or proprosecution approach to some of these issues than the
positions supported by the Code, but the Model Penal
Code approach to any given issue is still likely to be a
persuasive authority, or a starting point for analysis,
even where that position is not ultimately adopted.
And while academic commentators continue to pore
over the traditional criminal law issues, and often
propose criticisms or modifications of the Model Penal
Code responses to those issues, few would disagree
that the particular positions taken by the Model Penal
Code remain the conventional wisdom on a great
many subjects, and have stood the test of time as an
honorable and intelligent effort over all.
The Model Penal Code is a significantly less potent guide to the "special part" of the criminal law today. Congress (proud possessor of the most important
unreconstructed penal law in the country) and state
legislatures have poured out new criminal statutes
undreamed of by the drafters of the Model Penal
Code: both reformed and unreformed codes have been
extended over6 the last two decades7 by prohibitions
on
8
racketeering, money laundering, caijacking, computer crime,' domestic violence 0 and stalking," hate
*

6. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1964 (West 1994), and the numer-

ous state "little RICO" statutes modeled on it (West 1984 & Supp.
1997).
7. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956, 1957 (West Supp. 1997).
8. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119 (West Supp. 1997).
9. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 1984 & Supp. 1997); N.Y. Penal Law §§
156.00-156.50 (McKinney 1988).
10. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261, 2262 (West Supp. 1997).
11. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2261A (West Supp. 1997); Cal. Penal Code § 646.9
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crimes 12 and on and on through long lists of behaviors
that apparently did not exist in the 1950s, did not
trouble the drafters of the Model Penal Code, or were
thought not to require special statutory attention.
Statutes defining traditional crimes have often been
extensively reworked since the enactment of the Code:
the law of rape is perhaps the most obvious and dramatic example of a traditional crime for which the
statutory law of many American jurisdictions today is
completely different from the mid-century consensus
embodied in the Model Penal Code, and for the most
part adopted without great controversy in the early
post-Model Penal Code state codifications."3 Most
dramatic (and, I will argue below, most fundamental)
of all, the sentencing provisions of the Model Penal
Code, 4 which might be seen as the critical practical
test of what actually happens to violators of penal
prohibitions, now seem terribly quaint, and more than
any other portion of the Code, are completely inconsistent with the conventional wisdom of the present day.
This essay addresses some of the challenges that
would face the drafters of a new version of the Model
Penal Code, and especially a new federal penal code,
in light of the ideological changes that have occurred
since the original Code was finalized.
I.

THE CENTRALITY OF SENTENCING

An examination of the principal casebooks and
treatises on substantive criminal law would not suggest that sentencing is a terribly important subject.
Academics specializing in criminal law devote much
more attention to the purposes of the criminal law in
(West 1988); Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. 784.048 (West 1993).
12. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. 1989, § 939.645 (West 1996).
13. Compare, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-2 (West 1995), Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-402 (1995), or Wash. Crim. Code § 9A.44.060 (1988) with
Model Penal Code § 213.1.
14. Model Penal Code, art. 6.
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general, and to the principles that govern the line between criminality and non-criminality, than they do to
questions of the degrees of crime, or to the treatment
of particular offenders. The only area in which grading is featured in the typical law school course in substantive criminal law, and the area in which AngloAmerican law has given the greatest attention to the
subject, is that of homicide. Even there, however, the
specific practical consequences for individual defendants are rarely addressed. We lovingly analyze the
standards by which a particular instance of violent
death should be classified as murder or manslaughter,
but (except for the looming availability of capital
punishment) the student is rarely even informed what
the potential sentencing consequences of either verdict would be, let alone how the court would approach
the imposition of a specific prison sentence for a particular offender within whatever statutory maximum
might ultimately apply.
There are several different reasons for this inattention. One is that, until very recently, there was little or no "law" governing sentencing, so there was little to teach in a regime that primarily concerned itself
with teaching students about the content and policy
implications of legal rules. The distinction between
murder and manslaughter was and is governed by an
elaborate body of intricately detailed rules (common
law and later statutory). 5 Students and their professors can spend a lot of intellectually-satisfying energy
understanding the historical development of those
rules (what was meant by "benefit of clergy?"); the
content of the subtle distinctions they drew (if "spouse
caught in adultery" was "legally adequate provocation" but "mere words" were not, what then of a verbal
report of adultery?); the procedural underpinnings of
15. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials 405-437, 456-509 (6th
ed. 1995), for the extensive materials devoted to analyzing which
homicides qualify as murder.
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each rule (how does the broader mitigation provision
of the Model Penal Code affect the distribution of
functions between judge and jury?); and the moral
and policy implications of different versions of the rule
(should the adequacy of provocation be judged from
the standpoint of a reasonable person, from that of the
defendant, or from that of a reasonable person under
the circumstances as they appeared to the defendant?). But until very recently, no similar questions
could be asked about whether the defendant, convicted of manslaughter, should be sentenced to the
statutory maximum prison term or to probation. One
could discuss the wisdom of different possible outcomes, and even give reasons for and against them,
but one could not identify any legal rule governing the
decision, because there was none.
Any claim that sentencing issues were not discussed because they were lacking in practical or intellectual interest, however, was always deeply misleading. First of all, from a practical standpoint,
sentencing has always been the critical issue for
criminal lawyers' clients. In a world in which the
great majority of criminal defendants are convicted,
and the great majority of those convicted are convicted
by guilty plea, the line between guilty and not guilty
(especially when considered in the abstract as a matter of legal principle, rather than as a mundane factual question of what the evidence reveals about "who
done it?") matters far less than where the case will be
placed on the continuum of possible punishments. But
even from an academic standpoint, the absence of
"law" governing sentencing did not mean that sentencing was intellectually unimportant, but rather that
the issues surrounding the subject were submerged.
And indeed, the failure to discuss those issues obscured the fact that the very structure of the issues we
did discuss was crucially affected by certain covert
presuppositions about how sentencing would be approached.
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Take, for example, the felony murder rule-a
long-standing object of close attention from criminal
law scholars. The rule provides an opportunity for
scholars and law students to engage critically with
fundamental questions of culpability. Suppose that a
bank robber, in effecting his hasty getaway in a stolen
car, accidentally hits a pedestrian. If the pedestrian is
killed, the classic felony murder rule applies and the
defendant is guilty of murder, even if he had no intention to kill anyone. If the accident was unavoidable, or was primarily caused by the pedestrian's negligence, we ask ourselves whether it is fair to lay the
death to the robber's account. To what extent should
results count in determining punishment? Is it fair to
hold someone accountable for a consequence as to
which the actor bears no mental culpability, or at
least as to which he may not even have been negligent? If the actor was reckless or negligent, should
that degree of culpability govern his punishment for
the death, or should his guilt of a separate serious
crime somehow aggravate the homicide to the same
level as an intentional killing? We ponder these issues
deeply, as we should. The Model Penal Code, following
the apparent majority view among academic commentators, rejected the felony murder rule in principle
(though in an ill-fated pragmatic concession, adopted
an unusual "presumption" of extreme recklessness in
the case of several serious felonies 6). Most states continue to apply some version of the rule.
But felony murder's importance as a locus for discussing our views of culpability is, it seems to me,
largely an artifact of its place as a legal rule that determines a significant sentencing outcome. Because
application of the rule, at common law, classified an
offense as murder, it determined the applicability of
capital punishment to the defendant; even today, the
classification as murder is a critical step, in jurisdic16. See Model Penal Code § 210.2(1)(b) and commentary at 29-42.
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tions with capital punishment, for determining the
"death-eligibility" of the offender. The dramatic sentencing outcome makes the issue important; the fact
that it is a legal rule rather than a factor consulted in
the exercise of the court's discretion makes it a subject
of discussion in judicial opinions and in classrooms.
Essentially the same intellectual issues, however,
arise at the sentencing stages of ordinary cases. Suppose that the pedestrian in our example had been
paralyzed, but survived. No legal rule would turn the
accidental injury into a separate crime of aggravated
assault, because the injury occurred in the course of a
robbery, as the felony murder rule would turn an accidental death into murder. Yet, within the (generally
extremely expansive) limits of the maximum sentence
for armed robbery, a judge in a jurisdiction that applied traditional twentieth-century sentencing rules
could, in her sole discretion, have taken the pedestrian's tragic injury into account in setting the sentence to be served by the robber. For that matter, even
if the felony murder rule had been abolished in the
jurisdiction, the judge could similarly take account of
an accidental death in setting the robbery sentence.
Absent capital punishment, the consequences to the
defendant would in many cases be essentially identical to the outcome under a felony-murder rule: if the
judge thought a 20-year sentence was, on balance, the
appropriate punishment, given the total harm caused
by the perpetrator and his personal characteristics,
she would likely impose that very sentence, whether
under a felony murder rubric or as an "aggravated"
case of armed robbery.
Operationally and morally, the unintended consequence of the defendant's act thus has the same consequences for the defendant's punishment, and raises
the same issues, whether that consequence is treated
as an element of a separately-defined aggravated offense occupying its own position in the penal code, or
as a "sentencing factor" weighed by the court in as-
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signing a sentence within broad sentencing discretion
left to the courts by the legislature.
Indeed, one imagines that-again, assuming the
absence of capital punishment-the felony murder
rule would attract much less attention, even as a legal
rule, if it were reformulated as the definition of a
separate offense of "robbery in the first degree" with
the effect of increasing the maximum prison term to
be imposed on the robber. In New York, for example,
simple robbery ("forcible stealing"') is defined as a
class D felony; the offense is upgraded to a class C
felony when, among other possible aggravating circumstances, the robber causes physical injury to the
victim or another non-participant;' 9 and to a class B
felony when the injury caused is "serious."" No mental
culpability with respect to those injuries is specifically
required.2 ' Statutes of this kind have received little attention from scholars, though in principle they are
similar to felony murder statutes. A further aggravating step, within the robbery rubric, where the perpetrator causes death, would be a perfectly natural extension of these apparently uncontroversial statutes.
Had the law taken this path, and foregone the capital
consequences and the lurid label of "murder," one
doubts whether the fairness of the outcome would
have been as central a concern of criminal law scholarship as the felony-murder rule has been.
Sentencing, in short, matters, not only to those
whose fate is decided under our criminal law rules,
but also to the intellectual structure of the issues we
consider important. Where sentencing issues have
17. N.Y. Penal Law §160.00 (McKinney 1988).
18. Id. §160.05.
19. Id. §160.10.

20. Id. §160.15.
21. See, e.g., People v. Parker, 468 N.Y.S.2d 731 (4th Dep't 1983).

The Model Penal Code, however, consistent with its principles, aggravates the offense only where the actor, in the course of the robbery,

"purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily injury." Model
Penal Code § 222.1(2).
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dramatic consequences, and where those issues are
made part of the legal code defining crimes, we take
their moral consequences extremely seriously. Where
the consequences are less severe, but where grading
considerations are nevertheless made part of the
definitions of offenses, we have traditionally given
them less intense scrutiny, but the issues remain
visible for statutory drafting choices. But where the
grading issues have been relegated to the black hole of
broad and unreviewable judicial sentencing discretion, we have chosen not to think about the underlying issues of principle very much at all.
II. THE EFFECT OF SENTENCING PROCEDURES ON
SuBSTANTiVE CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXAMPLE OF THE
MODEL PENAL CODE

Let us return briefly to the example of aggravated
robbery discussed above. The New York Penal Law
creates several grades of robbery, depending (inter
alia) on the type of injury, if any, inflicted by the robber on the victim, a bystander, or a police officer,
without any reference to the mental culpability of the
robber with respect to such injury. The Model Penal
Code, in contrast, bases its grading distinction not on
the actual degree of injury inflicted, but (primarily) on
the robber's state of mind: aggravation occurs not
when the robber inflicts injury, but (essentially) when
he intends it. A robber who accidentally (i.e., nonculpably) inflicts even a grievous harm on a victim is
guilty only of simple robbery; but one who attempts to
inflict serious injury is guilty of the aggravated offense
even if he fails to inflict any physical damage at
22
all.
In substantial part, this is a difference in principle. The Model Penal Code's outcome is consistent
with a large number of provisions of the Code that
22. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
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emphasize mental culpability in determining criminality,- including the (partial) rejection of the felony
murder rule,' the easy imposition of attempt liability, 24 and the parity of punishment (for all offenses but
murder) for completed crimes and attempts. 25 Equally
consistently, in each of these cases the New York Penal Code's drafters modified the Model Penal Code
provisions in the direction of a greater emphasis on
harmful results rather than on blameworthy states of
mind.26
But I would like to call attention to another factor
that is operating here. Note that the New York Code
defines three separate degrees of robbery, while the
Model Penal Code defines only two.27 This too is consistent with a general tendency in each document. The
Model Penal Code defines only three grades of felonies
altogether,28 with ordinary maximum prison terms of
five years, ten years, and life. 29 These terms, moreover,
were indeterminate, in two senses: (1) the judge was
authorized to impose sentences less than the maximum, and (2) while the judge could limit the punishment by fixing the maximum term for any offender,
the actual length of time served short of that maximum would be determined in most cases by the parole
authorities. 0 The New York Penal Law, by contrast,
originally established five categories of felonies."'
While the prison terms attached to these categories
23. See note 16 and accompanying text.
24. Model Penal Code § 5.01, with particular reference to

25. Id.

§ 5.01(2).

§ 5.05(1).

26. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1998) (adopting
felony murder rule); § 110.00 (McKinney 1998) (less expansive definition of attempt); § 110.05 (McKinney 1998) (grading most attempts as
lesser crimes than the corresponding completed offense).
27. Compare N.Y. Penal Law §§ 160.05, 160.10, 160.15 with Model
Penal Code § 222.1(2).
28. Model Penal Code § 6.01(1).
29. Id. § 6.06.

30. Id.
31. The basic outline of this structure is preserved in N.Y. Penal
Law § 70.00(2) (McKinney 1998).
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were also indeterminate and parolable, the greater
number of categories gave the legislature a greater
ability to graduate offenses according to a variety of
criteria of seriousness.
Moreover, as the years passed, the legislature
adapted the code by adopting still more categories of
offenses. Class A felonies were subdivided into classes
A-I and A-II;12 classes B through E were subdivided
into "violent" and "non-violent" sub-classes, with different sentencing consequences attaching to each
category. 3 Today there are at least ten classes of felonies under New York law, compared to the Model Penal Code's three. 4
Of course, the greater refinement of the classification scheme has been a product of a movement to
restrict judicial sentencing discretion by creating narrower categories of offenses, with various mandatory
sentencing consequences. In effect, the legislature has
taken back to itself, to a greater degree than had been
the case when the Penal Code was initially revised,
the task of deciding what factors should bear on sentencing, and to what degree. This political development emphasizes the degree to which the grading of
offenses within a penal code depends on the sentencing philosophy of its drafters. The special part of the
Model Penal Code, in particular, was quite selfconsciously drafted in light of its sentencing provisions, which in turn were based on the sentencing
philosophy of the times.
As the late Professor Frank Remington has
pointed out, when the Model Penal Code project was
first proposed to the American Law Institute (ALI),
Herbert Wechsler specifically emphasized that the
32. Id. § 70.00(3)(a).
33. Id. § 70.02.
34. Even this accounting omits the bewildering variety of sentencing
provisions further specifying expanded punishments, as to various of
these categories, depending on the prior criminal record of the offender.
See id. §§ 70.04, 70.06, 70.08, 70.10.
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project of penal code reform and simplification was
possible and desirable precisely because so "much of
what we think of as the substantive law of crime consists actually of drawing discriminations that have
ultimately treatment or penalty consequences...
[Once that is understood,] [o]ne immediately perceives
at least the possibility... [of] a much simpler penal
code."05 The point of Professor Wechsler's observation
was that the distinctions of the substantive criminal
law are in large part about the treatment of offenders,
and that the definition of crimes, particularly insofar
as it concerns the special part of the penal law, with
its differentiations of different types and degrees of
crime, is largely a matter of drawing a line between
two different stages of criminal law and procedure:
the guilt phase and the sentencing phase.36
If one assumes the existence and desirability of
broad judicial sentencing discretion-as Wechsler and
his colleagues manifestly did, working at a time when
indeterminate sentencing, judicial discretion to tailor
the sentence to the offender, and the rehabilitationist
penological ideal that drove both practices, held unchallenged dominance over American law-then it
makes sense to streamline the categories of offenses.
Major levels of culpability, defined in very broad
strokes, should be formally distinguished in the penal
code. But most of the finer gradations in culpability
would not need to be reflected in the code. They concerned only (only!) the "treatment or penalty consequences" of crime, and so could be expected to be outweighed by those factors concerning the individual's
background and amenability to rehabilitation that

35. Frank J. Remington, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a
Criminal Code: Why the Model Penal Code Approach is Preferable, 7
Fed. Sentencing Rep. 116, 116 (1994), quoting Herbert Wechsler from
the proceedings of the American Law Institute.
36. I have addressed some of the issues below in Gerard E. Lynch,
The Sentencing Guidelines as a Not-So-Model Penal Code, 7 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 112 (1994).
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would dominate judicial and administrative decisions
about the necessary length of incarceration.
Given such assumptions, it might make sense to
distinguish, broadly, between a robber who attempts
to inflict serious injury and one who hopes only to
steal some property and get away without hurting
anyone. Such categories make moral sense, and it is
reasonable to assume that the former offender was a
more hardened and dangerous case who might well
need a longer spell of "correction" or would more urgently need incapacitative confinement to protect the
public while his treatment went on. Of course, one
could imagine a vast number of other distinctions that
might be relevant to ranking the offensiveness of individual acts of robbery: was a weapon carried?; if so,
of what kind?; was the weapon displayed or held in
reserve-or actually used?; did more than one robber
participate?; how much money or property was stolen?; was the victim especially vulnerable, and was
that vulnerability actively exploited?; was injury actually inflicted on anyone, and if so, how serious was
it? These distinctions, however, could safely be left to
the sentencing discretion of the judge. Within the very
broad confines left by the ten-year maximum sentence
made available for the basic offense of robbery, there
was plenty of room for the court to reflect in the particular sentence imposed both the moral seriousness of
the specific instance of forcible theft involved and the
more or less hardened or depraved character of the offender that such variations could reveal. The entire
goal of simplifying the penal code counseled against
multiplying different types of offenses based on factors
that made only a small difference to the culpability of
the offender. (What would the Code's framers have
made of a separate crime of "computer fraud"?)
The Code drafters' commitment to rehabilitationist sentencing and judicial discretion, then, is manifest not only in the specific sentencing provisions of
the Code, which explicitly adopt the indeterminate
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sentencing model prevalent at the time it was drafted,
but also in the very structure of the Code's substantive definitions of particular crimes. If it had been
thought desirable to control judicial discretion more
rigidly, or to define more precisely the penalties attaching to different acts, the goal of a more rational
penal code would still have made sense, but there
would have been little call for a "simpler" penal code.
If matters going to the "treatment or penalty consequences" of criminal acts were to be determined by the
legislature, on the basis of general rules, rather than
by judges, as a matter of selecting an appropriate correctional sentence, then a great many more
"discriminations that have ultimately treatment or
penalty consequences" would have been written directly into the penal code itself.
III. THE MOVEMENT TO GREATER SPECIFICITY

As the reception of the Code shows, legislatures
have always had a tendency to write into the penal
law more such distinctions than were strictly necessary under the rehabilitative ideal. Even when California's penal code essentially provided for indeterminate (and indiscriminate) sentences of one year to life
for all felonies, the legislature did not do away with
the traditional labels distinguishing different felonies:
robbery was still a separate crime, even though it
might not make any difference to your sentence
whether your crime was called robbery or larceny.
And as the influential New York Penal Law showed,
legislatures could happily adopt the general rehabilitative sentencing philosophy of the Model Penal Code,
enthusiastically endorse its streamlined and rationalized sets of definitions-and still decide that three degrees of felonious larceny were better than one, or that
multiple levels of statutory rape based on the varia-
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tions in the parties' ages3 7 were a desirable innovation.
But with the waning of the rehabilitationist ideal,
the Code's categories came under much more pressure. With judicial discretion under attack as too arbitrary and too lenient to offenders, with rehabilitation
viewed as both "soft on crime" and unworkable, and
with retributionist sentencing based on 'just deserts"
seen both as a philosophical corrective and as a means
of controlling liberal judges in an era of rising crime
rates, legislatures adopted a far more aggressive approach to defining crimes. Mandatory minimum sentences were called for-but if the legislature was going to mandate a lengthy sentence of imprisonment
for some offenders, it would have to define which ones.
Broad, relaxed definitions of crimes that were appropriate when judges were trusted to set an appropriate
level of punishment became less attractive when
harsh mandatory terms were on the cards-even politicians eager to assure the public that they were as
"tough on crime" as possible could (usually) see that
not everyone who fell within a broad definition of
"robber" or "drug dealer" required an unmitigated tenor twenty-year sentence. And so the categories of
crime increased, and narrower, graduated definitions
of crime became more common, as the movement away
from judicial discretion and toward more certain and
severe penalties took hold.
Such mandatory sentencing regimes, however,
could take a variety of forms. The most traditional
form involved simply writing into the penal law a new
distinction, creating new degrees of crimes, with mandatory sentences of different levels provided for the
different degrees. New York's famed "Rockefeller drug
laws" took this form. 8
Creating a multitude of newly subdivided crimes,
however, is in direct tension with the goal of the
37. See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 130.25, 130.30, 130.35 (McKinney 1998).
38. See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 220.18, 220.21 (McKinney 1989), §
70.00.3(a) (McKinney 1998).
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drafters of the Model Penal Code to create a simplified
criminal code. While legislatures have preferred a
somewhat more nuanced treatment of crimes than the
Code provided, they have generally respected the goal
that penal codes not be loaded down with dozens of
overlapping offenses, or with minutely detailed statutory rankings of degrees of offenses. While the accretion over the years of novel offenses has somewhat
cluttered the elegance of the freshly-minted Model
Penal Code-influenced reformed penal codes of the
1960s and 1970s, the skeleton of the Code usually remains visible under the accumulated bulk. 9 Drafters
of a new edition of the Model Penal Code, even if they
adopted the legislative preference for greater detail
and the now-dominant penological emphasis on retribution and restricted judicial discretion, would presumably still want to limit the extent to which a multiplicity of highly-specific offenses obscured the clarity
of the penal code, for citizens and law-enforcement officials alike.
There are significant procedural consequences,
moreover, to writing into the penal code
"discriminations that have ultimately treatment or
penalty consequences." When we define murder and
manslaughter as separate crimes, the prosecution
must prove the facts distinguishing the more serious
crime from the less serious to the satisfaction of the
jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, before the heavier
sentence can be imposed. The same may be true when
we divide grand larceny or sale of controlled substances into degrees, with differing maximum or
mandatory minimum penalties for each version of the
39. Title 18 of the United States Code remains the great counterexample of the unreformed Code, whose chaos seems to feed on itself, inviting steady growth in every direction. For all its lack of elegance,
however, it is possible that the very ungainliness of federal criminal
law has been less discouraging (for good or ill) to creativity and innovation than the Model Penal Code-based codes, which by their very
form promote a feeling of closure and completeness.
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offense." If writing an aggravating factor with a mandatory penalty into the penal code decreases the likelihood that a misguided judge will ignore or underemphasize such a factor in imposing a discretionary
sentence, the procedural burdens associated with
proving additional elements of crimes may dissuade
prosecutors from insisting on charging the higher degree of offense, or encourage defendants to go to trial
on issues that, under a more general definition
4 1 of the
offense, would be relevant only to sentencing.
The very clarity and simplicity of Model Penal
Code-based penal codes probably facilitated legislative
adoption of additional, more nuanced definitions of
crimes. Where a code was already constructed according to a principle that attempted to separate and define different categories of crime, and provide for
punishment according to a broadly schematized hierarchy of harms and punishments, a structure was already in place that facilitated the further subdivision
of crimes and punishments. When the legislature
identified a factor that it believed should be recognized in every case as requiring a higher punishment,
40. See People v. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497 (1993). In Ryan, the New
York Court of Appeals held that statutes penalizing by escalating sentences the "knowing" possession of increasing amounts of controlled
substances required proof that the defendant knew the weight in question. Although this holding was eventually overruled by statute, 1995
N.Y. Laws ch. 75; see William C. Donnino, Supplementary Practice
Commentaries to N.Y. Penal Law art. 220 (1998 Supp.) at 1-4, the actual amount of narcotics possessed continues to be an element of the
various degrees of narcotics possession offenses. Under federal law, by
contrast, it has been held that the amounts of narcotics triggering
mandatory minimum sentences are not offense elements, but merely
sentencing factors. See, e.g., United States v. DeSimone, 119 F.3d 217
(2d Cir. 1997).
41. The nature of the burden depends heavily on the amenability of
the aggravating factor to easy proof. If, for example, the legislature
creates an enhanced offense for crimes committed against the elderly,
the procedural consequences are likely to be slight; in most cases, the
age of the victim will be readily established. A statute creating an aggravated offense for bias crimes is more problematic; the intent of the
offender is generally a more contestable issue.
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it was usually a simple enough matter to create an
aggravated form of an existing offense, that raised the
grade of the crime to the next higher level in an existing scheme, or permitted the introduction of a new intermediate classification. The basic structure of the
Code was thus preserved, if in a more elaborated form.
When the same political and philosophical pressures for controlling discretion operated on the Congress, however, such simple amendment was not a
broadly available option. Some crimes could be subdivided in an ad hoc way, of course. When savings and
loan officials seemed to have committed fraud on a
massive scale, Congress created an enhanced penalty
for mail and wire frauds involving banks.42 Concerned
that penalties for fraud on government programs were
too slight for fraud involving large financial gain,
Congress created a new crime, with enhanced penalties, where the fraud concerned a contract worth over
$1,000,000." Moreover, Congress has stratified various drug distribution offenses based on the amounts
sold, and has frequently adjusted the mandatory
minimum sentences applicable to them.4
But the very incoherence and randomness of the
unrevised federal criminal "code" effectively prevents
Congress from efficiently micro-managing the sentencing provisions of its sprawling mass of overlapping,
inconsistent criminal statutes. Accordingly, when
Congress moved in a major way to control judicial sentencing discretion, it opted for a more comprehensive
plan, creating a separate administrative agency, the
United States Sentencing Commission, which was
charged with the task of creating comprehensive sentencing guidelines to limit the discretion of the courts
and to identify factors appropriately to be taken into

42. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 1984 & Supp. 1998).
43. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1031 (West Supp. 1998).
44. For the current set of penalty gradations for distributing various
drugs, see 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b) (West 1981 & Supp. 1998).
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account by judges in imposing sentences."
Faced in turn with the daunting task of creating
guidelines to match the welter of federal penal statutes, the Commission in effect elected to organize and
codify federal criminal law by essentially disregarding
the specific statutes creating the offenses on which
sentences would be imposed, and instead creating its
own classification of offenses, with the same guidelines applying to various federal statutes that the
Commission felt addressed similar kinds of harms.
Thus, for example, while Congress had created a variety of fraud statutes, with miscellaneous sentencing
provisions, the Commission imposed the same sentencing structure on all offenses involving fraud or deceit, and applied its own calculus of aggravating factors to determine the specific sentence to be applied."
The substantive distinction between legislative
enactments carving an offense into different degrees
with different punishment structures, and sentencing
guidelines subdividing a single legislatively-defined
crime (or a group of related crimes) according to
regulations identifying aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, is of course a slim one. In each case,
the regulatory structure attempts to identify the factors that justify more severe or more lenient treatment
for different degrees of wrongdoing in a related area,
in order to specify the punishment that ought to be
imposed on those who violate the rules. As is well
known by now, however, the courts, led by the United
States Supreme Court, have generally held that the
procedural consequences of the two methods of hierarchizing punishments are dramatically different. Relying in large part on case law decided under the regime
of wide open discretionary sentencing in furtherance
of a rehabilitationist philosophy, the courts have generally concluded that "mere" sentencing factors, going
45. See the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, codified at 28 U.S.C.A.

§§ 991-98 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998).
46. See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 (1987).
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only to the appropriate sentence to be imposed within
a legislatively-defined maximum for the offense of
conviction, need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and can be found by a judge, rather
than by a jury." Statutory elements of the offense of
conviction, of course, continue to be subject to reof jury determination beyond a reasonable
quirements
48
doubt.
The reduced procedural scrutiny accorded to sentencing factors (as compared to offense elements) has
attracted the most attention in the context of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, where fairly rigid regulations define precise increments of punishment attached to specific aggravating factors based on facts
determined by the court. It is noteworthy, however,
that the first constitutional decision by the Supreme
Court endorsing reduced procedural standards for
sentencing factors dealt not with the guidelines, but
with a state statute providing a mandatory sentencing
enhancement where a firearm was "visibly possessed"
during certain offenses.49 The Court's holding in
McMillan v. Pennsylvania thus opens up the possibility that legislatures adopting ad hoc modifications of
the penal code may limit the procedural implications
of mandatory sentencing directives they adopt, so long
as they distinguish the facts on which enhanced sentences turn as "sentencing factors" rather than as
elements of separately-defined offenses. Legislatures
thus may take advantage of the procedural flexibility
adopting a compreof the guidelines regime without
in the guidelines mode.
hensive sentencing reform
47. The Supreme Court has left open a circuit conflict about
whether, in extreme circumstances, conduct that would dramatically
il*crease punishment must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
48. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
49. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
50. Since these words were written, a narrow majority of the Supreme Court has found that Congress availed itself of this flexibility by
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IV. THE CHALLENGE OF PENAL CODE REFORM IN A
GUIDELINES ERA

These developments in penal and sentencing law
have dramatic consequences for any effort to revise
the Model Penal Code for the next generation, or to
codify and reform federal criminal law. One may well
believe that the retreat from judicial discretion, and
the parallel move away from rehabilitation and toward retribution as the dominant penal philosophy,
represent a mistaken course. But while I am sympathetic to that view, I think it is fair to predict that reform proposals based on the sentencing philosophy
that underlay the Model Penal Code would have little
chance of adoption today. Indeed, while I would guess
that the Code's philosophy has more adherents among
law professors and judges than among legislators, a
codification that did not provide in some way for more
specific controls on sentencing based on considerably
narrower classifications of offense behavior than those
in the Model Penal Code would not command a consensus of any representative body of legal academics,
judges and practitioners like the ALI in the first place.
As I suggested earlier, a codification for the 21st century might very well adopt a large part of the "general
part" of the Model Penal Code, but the "special part"
defining offenses would have to take substantial account of the change of sentencing philosophy of the
last quarter of this century.
More specifically, it seems to me that the challenge of the special part of any federal code plan, or
any "Model Penal Code 2d" addressed to state legisla-

creating dramatically increased penalties (20-year rather than 2-year
maximum prison terms) for certain categories of immigration offenders, not by defining separate offenses, but simply by specifying a
"sentencing factor" that need not be charged in the indictment, or found
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but can simply be determined by a
judge at sentencing. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S. Ct.
1219 (1998).
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tures, is precisely to draw the line between those factors that ought to be part of a more nuanced and
graduated set of penalties built into the penal code itself, and those factors that should be left to judicial
determination-whether or not subject to some sort of
guidelines-and that are therefore specifically not included in the penal code. In effect, the challenge is to
distinguish between those facts bearing on seriousness of offense and punishment that should be treated
as "elements of the offense" and those that can be
treated as mere "sentencing factors."
Let me first address a preliminary objection from
the left. It might well be argued that this distinction is
itself spurious, and that any fact that makes a material difference in punishment should be required to be
proved, to the satisfaction of a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt. Any rule short of this, one could contend,
will invite legislatures to lower the burden of proof in
criminal cases by broadening the definitions of offenses, and relegating the myriad of factors that have
traditionally distinguished less serious from more serious offenses to the sentencing stage, to be determined by reduced procedural standards. Such an outcome, the argument would go, will significantly erode
the procedural protections of the Bill of Rights, not by
repeal but by evasion.
There is, of course, something substantial to this
concern. I would accept a distinction between offense
elements and sentencing factors, however, both because I must, under current law, and because I think
that at some level the distinction is necessary and
sound. First, as a matter of constitutional law, the argument that any fact leading to increased punishment
must be proved at a jury trial beyond a reasonable
doubt has simply failed. The Supreme Court's recent
cases make perfectly plain that sentencing guideline
schemes may permissibly tie punishment increments
to facts that are proven subject to reduced procedural
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standards."'
More importantly, however, it seems to me that
these decisions-at least at the level of abstract principle-must be correct. During the age of broad judicial sentencing discretion, judges frequently made
sentencing decisions on the basis of facts that they determined for themselves, on less than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, without eliciting very much concern
from civil libertarians." True, at least some such decisions were based on very "soft" facts, such as general
determinations of a defendant's character, that may
have required less rigid evidentiary standards than
the determination of the more concrete factors relating
to the offense itself characteristic of the present age of
guidelines. But too much should not be made of this
distinction. The sentence in any number of traditional
discretionary situations depended quite directly on
judicial findings of specific contested facts: was the
gun displayed a real gun or a toy?; was this particular
co-conspirator aware of all the criminal activities of
his fellows, or only of some of them?; was the defendant's participation in this particular drug sale an
isolated act or part of a regular course of dealing?
Whether because such facts were directly relevant to
the judge's retributionist assessment of how serious
the particular offense was (within the spectrum of
conduct covered by the statute of conviction), or because they bore on a determination of how much rehabilitation the offender's character was likely to
need, the sentence would be higher or lower, in some
specific degree determined by the judge, based on the
judge's factual conclusions.
It seems to me that such determinations are, as a
matter of principle, neither more nor less acceptable
when the weight to be given them is fixed by a sentencing commission than when an individual judge is
51. See, e.g. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 79, Almendarez-Torres, 118 S.
Ct. at 1219.
52. See generally Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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free to accord them such weight as she thinks fit. If it
was acceptable for a judge, operating under the Model
Penal Code's sentencing policy, to decide that the defendant before him was a Mafia member who committed the assault on orders of a crime boss, rather than,
as he contended, just an acquaintance of the victim
who acted out of anger, and to allow that fact to influence the degree of punishment or "correction" required
for the defendant, it is difficult for me to see why the
fact must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a
jury once an institutional mechanism is in place to
insist that the few judges who would not have regarded this fact as relevant on their own take it into
account nevertheless. Whether the fact is made relevant by an individual judge's sentencing philosophy or
a generally-agreed sentencing scheme to which all
judges are expected to adhere does not, in itself, dictate the procedural safeguards that are necessary in
finding the fact.
And whatever the degree of precision our penal
codes were to attain, there would always be some
morally relevant factual variation within the offenses
defined. Criminal offenses, like other forms of human
activity, are infinitely varied in their physical and
mental characteristics, and in the contexts in which
they occur. Even the federal guidelines, much derided
for the mechanical precision with which they attempt
to chart variations in criminal conduct, leave
room-at the higher reaches, substantial room-for
discretion, and fail to account for all the minute degrees of good and evil within any given classification
of crime. Unless we were satisfied to lump together,
for mandatorily-identical punishment, large numbers
of offenders whose acts vary in morally-relevant ways,
there will always be some facts not captured in the
definition of the offense or the corresponding guideline that will be relevant to the precise degree of punishment, that will be subject to contest, and that must
be decided by a judge outside the setting of a trial.
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The problem, I would submit, is not that the distinction between sentencing factors and offense elements is illegitimate; the problem, rather, is one of
identifying what factors are sufficiently important
morally, and accordingly will have sufficiently serious
sentencing consequences, that they ought to be included in the penal code as elements of offenses, and
subject to the procedural safeguards traditionally attaching to such elements.
Resolving this problem is, inevitably, primarily a
task for the legislature. The Supreme Court has suggested that there may be constitutional limits to the
legislature's ability to redefine at least such factors as
have traditionally been utilized to distinguish different crimes as sentencing factors rather than offense
elements.53 It is difficult to see, however, how judicially-manageable standards for imposing such limits
can be developed. The Court has frequently stated
that the power to define crimes ordinarily belongs to
the legislature. More importantly, its few ventures
into creating constitutional limits on the substantive
criminal law have regularly proven abortive. The examples are familiar. In Robinson v. California,4 the
Court seemed to suggest that the constitution required a voluntary act for criminal liability, but
promptly retreated." In Lambert v. California," the
Court seemed to suggest constitutional limits to strict
liability offenses, at least with respect to omissions.
But as Justice Frankfurter predicted in dissent, 7 the
case has been barren of progeny. Most relevant of all,
the Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur58 seemed prepared to
mount a defense of the requirement of proof beyond a
53. See, e.g., McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86-87; Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197, 210-211 (1977).
54. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
55. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
56. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
57. Id. at 232.
58. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
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reasonable doubt against state efforts to shift the burden of proof by redefining traditional elements of
crimes as affirmative defenses, but in Patterson v.
New York, 59 the Court largely abandoned that effort as
well, leaving it to legislatures to decide how to structure elements and defenses in ways that would permit
differences in punishment to turn on facts that were
not proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt. In Patterson, as in McMillan, the Court noted

that there may be limits beyond which the legislature
could not go, 0 but those limits have not yet been
tested.
About the only limitation that would have a reasonable chance of judicial enforcement in the present
judicial climate is one of tradition. As in the area of
substantive due process,6' the Court might be prepared to find implicit in the Constitution practices
that have a long and settled history reaching back to
the common law. If a legislature were to abolish the
crimes of murder and manslaughter, and replace them
with a generic crime of homicide, leaving it to the sentencing judge to determine the actual sentence under
guidelines providing different sentences depending,
inter alia, on whether the death was caused intentionally, recklessly or negligently, whether there was
provocation, and whether the defendant was engaged
in a felony, the Court might find an evasion of the
constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But most gradations of crimes do not have
such deep and accepted roots in the common law.
It would presumably be constitutional, then, for a
legislature to return to the simplicity of the Model Penal Code with respect to the definitions of crimes, creating only a few broad categories of felonies with
broad sentencing ranges for each, and defining par59. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
60. See note 53 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2262-69
(1997).
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ticular crimes in a very general way, covering very diverse forms of wrongdoing. (Presumably, in the current political climate, those categories would be likely
to carry harsher maximum punishments than those
provided by the Model Penal Code-perhaps ten
years, 25 years, and life imprisonment instead of the
Code's five, ten and life). But instead of the Code's
sentencing regime, with its presumption in favor of
the least deprivation of liberty consistent with the
goals of the Code, and its broad judicial discretion, the
legislature could substitute a federal-guidelines-style
sentencing regime, in which the sorts of distinctions
found attractive by legislatures reacting to the Model
Penal Code (grades of larceny depending on amount
stolen, grades of robbery depending on weapons used
or physical injuries inflicted, grades of statutory rape
based on the age differentials of the parties, grades of
narcotics distribution according to amounts sold) are
relegated instead to mandatory or near-mandatory
guidelines regimes, with the relevant facts to be determined in non-jury sentencing proceedings under a
reduced standard of proof.
But assuming such a regime would be constitutional, the drafters of a Model Penal Code, Second-and any legislative body undertaking a related
criminal law reform-would have to consider whether
such an approach would be wise. As pointed out
above, the simplification and reduction of categories
that marked the Model Penal Code's approach to
drafting the definitions of particular crimes was intimately linked to the sentencing philosophy prevalent
at the time of its drafting. Even if the same approach
could constitutionally be adapted to the different penal attitudes dominant today, and even if there were
widespread agreement that some factors bearing on
the degree of punishment can properly be relegated to
a second-tier regulatory code, with a second-tier system of fact-finding, a properly-constructed penal code
for a retributionist era should, in my view, be more
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sensitive to the distinction between critical classifications of moral conduct that should be reflected on the
surface of the penal code, and lesser gradations of
guilt.
The difference, ultimately, is one of degree. There
will of course be differences of opinion about whether
a particular distinction is so important that it ought to
be treated as an offense element, and these differences
will not be resolvable according to some formula-if
they were, they would be more susceptible to policing
by the Supreme Court as a matter of constitutional
law. But such disputes should not obscure the fact
that an important principle is at stake. There is a difference between concluding in good faith that a particular culpability factor is sufficiently minor to be
treated as a sentencing factor and yielding to the
temptation to channel as many factors as possible into
the sentencing process, to promote efficiency, minimize trial issues, and maximize the chances of imposing the highest possible punishment.
V.

DISTINGUISHING OFFENSE ELEMENTS FROM

SENTENCING FACTORS: A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
How should we determine what factors ought to
be treated as offense elements? That is, of course,
precisely the challenge that a new Model Penal Code,
or a new federal Code revision, would have to answer.
I would tentatively propose a functional test, at least
as a framework for analysis. The appropriateness of
treating a factor as an offense element or a sentencing
factor has to be judged on the basis of what is at stake
in the distinction. At least four important consequences suggest themselves. Two are substantive: the
moral significance of the factor and the degree of
punishment attendent on the factor. And two are procedural or institutional: the method of fact-finding
and the law-making institution responsible for determining the significance of the factor.
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A. Sending Moral Messages
The penal code, as Professor Meir Dan-Cohen has
famously pointed out, is addressed to at least two different audiences. It issues some directives to the
population at large (don't do x), and other directives to
government officials (if someone does x, punish her
with consequence y). 62 There are some tensions between the two types of rule. We might want to tell the
citizens not to do x, but if we also want to tell the
judges to go easy on people who do, we may undermine the power of that directive."
When it speaks to the people at large, the penal
code is largely concerned with setting out the basic
moral rules governing the society. By defining conduct
as criminal, we locate that conduct beyond the bounds
of morally acceptable behavior, and impose a fundamental condemnation on it. The gradations of crimes
also play an important part in that moral instruction.
A criminal code that simply listed indiscriminately all
the things that we forbid would not tell us everything
we want to know about our society's moral code. We
also want to know, at least in a general way, how
these various offenses rank in the eyes of the com62. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984).
63. Those who see the criminal law as an instrument for reducing
crime, or serving other consequentialist values, tend to emphasize the
importance of the criminal law's instructions to the officials charged
with enforcing it: what behavior are we trying to alter, what punishments or other treatments will enable us best to do that, what should
government officials do to implement those strategies. The definitions
of particular crimes will be important to the extent that they define
what conduct needs control, and limit to particular situations the tendency of officials to restrict liberty.
Retributionists, on the other hand, tend to emphasize the penal
code's instructions to the citizens; the criminal code is viewed primarily
as a statement of society's fundamental moral judgments about different kinds of conduct. In an era of increased attention to the retributionist view, the substantive content of particular definitions of criminal
conduct may take on more importance than the technology of crime
control and sentencing.
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munity. That we prohibit certain conduct tells us
something about what we value; that we condemn
some conduct more than others tells us something
about the hierarchy of our values.
The grading of different offenses is thus an important function of the penal code. And if the code is
where we can read our most important moral values,
it must be legible, in some basic way, by the people.
Title 18 of the United States Code is a bad penal code
(among other reasons) because its jumble of miscellaneous prohibitions does not intelligibly encode for the
people what kinds of acts we are trying to prohibit,
how those acts relate to each other, the values we hold
important, and how we rank the offenses in moral seriousness. But just as it is wrong to have a code that
contains prohibitions that are too many and too specific to allow legibility, it would be equally wrong to
reduce the penal code to a mere handful of extremely
broad injunctions (Don't harm others' persons or property), with the details of the ranking left to a separate
code of minutely-detailed sentencing directives. That
would leave us with two equally unsatisfying volumes:
one that did nothing to give form to our values, and
another that failed to distinguish the important from
the trivial.
The unsurprising conclusion is that the more
moral importance a distinction carries, the more important it is to treat that distinction as an offense
element that is part of the penal code. The less moral
weight a distinction bears, the more permissible it is
to relegate it to the sentencing stage (whether as part
of a code of sentencing guidelines or as an item to be
considered by judges as part of their discretion.)
Unsurprisingly, most of the traditional distinctions that have been made in the common law and
statutory definitions of crime meet this test. Robbery,
for example, can be seen as nothing more than an ag-
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gravated form of larceny.64 It would be easy, and, I
think, constitutionally permissible, for a legislature to
abolish the crime of robbery, and relegate the additional element of force to the sentencing stage, perhaps with instructions to the courts or any sentencing
commission to treat the use of force in the course of a
larceny as a substantial aggravating factor in imposing punishments. But the traditional treatment of
robbery as a separate crime would appear to be rooted
in a fairly deep and widely-shared intuition that the
difference between the mugger and the shoplifter or
embezzler is not merely a difference in degree, but one
of kind. Someone who resorts to force rather than subterfuge to obtain property has crossed a significant
moral line, by committing a crime of violence against
the person. Robbery is generally perceived not simply
as a special, somewhat worse, way of stealing, but as a
different type and level of wrongdoing altogether. The
task of the penal code in describing our values by labeling and ranking wrongs is furthered by defining
robbery as a separate offense.
Dividing robbery into degrees based on, for example, the use of a weapon presents a closer issue. Is
it important to label differentially the offenses of robbing with a gun and of robbing by bare-handed physical force? Most states do, in one form or another, make
this distinction part of the penal code.65 The Model
Penal Code does not, reserving its higher category of
robbery for cases involving imposition of serious injury." Federal law varies.67
64. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 160.00 ("Robbery is forcible stealing.").
65. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 160.10(2)(b) (use of weapon aggravates robbery to second degree), § 160.15(4) (use of loaded firearm aggravates crime to first degree).
66. Model Penal Code § 222.1(2) (robbery offense aggravated if actor
attempts to kill, or attempts to or does inflict serious injury).
67. Bank robbery is divided into two separate crimes, see 18
U.S.C.A. § 2113(a), (d) (West 1984 & Supp. 1991), while robbery affecting interstate commerce is not, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1951 (West 1984 & Supp.
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The question can be usefully clarified by asking
what paradigmatic crimes we are imagining when we
think of armed robbery. The difference between the
mugger who knocks down an elderly woman and
steals her purse and the one who demands the purse
at knife point may seem one of degree-and contestable degree at that: most people, I'd guess, would find
the fear created by the threat of deadly force implicit
in the knife a significant aggravating factor, but it can
certainly be argued that a polite transaction at knife
point is less terrifying, and imposes less actual damage, than a surprise violent physical assault. But if we
are comparing the purse-snatcher to the hold-up artist
robbing the convenience store, gas station or bank
with a firearm, I at least begin to perceive a significant leap in public danger and moral degradation. My
own inclination would be to recognize at least some
form of aggravated robbery, short of the extremely
limited category provided by the Model Penal Code, as
a separate, more serious crime, and to make the use of
a weapon at least one of the factors that would mark
the separate category. But in the end, reasonable
judgments can certainly differ, and only the legislature can decide the essentially political question of
public values involved. My purpose here is not to argue for any particular resolution to this question, but
only to suggest a way of thinking about the problem
by focusing on the extent to which we see qualitative
moral differences between categories of offense rather
than simply minor differences in degree of moral guilt
within such categories.
Differences in mental culpability will often mark
significant degrees of moral wrongdoing that should
1998). The mere possession of a firearm in connection with certain
crimes is treated as a sentencing factor by the guidelines, see, e.g.,
U.S.S.G. §§ 2A6.2(b)(1)(C), 2B3.1(b)(2)(C), 2Dl.l(b)(1), but the use or
carrying of a firearm in connection with a drug or violent crime is
treated as a separate offense, with its own mandatory, consecutive sentence. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West 1976 & Supp. 1998).
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be recognized on the surface of a penal code. The
classic divisions of homicide mark the importance we
attach to distinguishing intentional from reckless or
negligent wrongdoing, and the murder/manslaughter
distinction suggests that even intentional acts can be
further subdivided into morally significant subcategories depending on the subjective emotions and
motivations involved. We could, of course, reflect those
differences at the punishment stage, directing officials
to aggravate or mitigate some "base offense level" for a
generalized offense of unlawfully causing death. But
this, it seems to me, would be wrong, because lumping
reckless drivers with Mafia hit-men, or bar-room
brawlers with careless wrecking-ball crews, under a
single penal label confuses distinctions that are important to us, not only as measures of punishment,
but also as indicators of the community's moral standards.
Other distinctions that have commonly been made
in the penal law seem less significant as moral
boundaries. Many statutes classify similar conduct
into separate crimes by dividers that are frankly matters of degree: for example, larceny may be divided
into different felonies (and misdemeanors) according
to the amount stolen, 68 and narcotics offenses may be
classified according to amounts possessed or distributed.69 Within those categories, sentencing judges
have commonly taken quantities further into account
as a sentencing factor, and the federal guidelines fetishize quantitative factors in the narcotics, fraud,
theft and tax evasion tables."0
68. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law §§ 155.25, 155.30, 155.35, 155.40,
1555.42 (McKinney 1988) (creating crimes of petit larceny and four degrees of grand larceny, depending, inter alia, on the value of the property stolen).
69. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law §§ 220.03, 220.06, 220.09, 220.16,
220.18, 220.21 (McKinney 1988) (creating crimes of possession of a con-

trolled substance in the seventh, fifth, fourth, third, second and first
degrees depending on the type and amount of drug possessed).
70. U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.1(b) (larceny table, creates 21 separate offense
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To the extent that the numbers are morally important at all (and it seems to me they are far less important than they are apparently thought to be by the
United States Sentencing Commission), these distinctions may fairly be relegated to the sentencing stage.
A thief is a thief, one might well conclude, and the
amount stolen is more an artifact of ambient conditions than a measure of the culprit's moral status: a
grand embezzler is usually just a petty embezzler who
had access to a larger or less carefully-protected till.
The fact that the bigger crook inflicted more harm
might justify a larger punishment, but it does not create a different moral category.
But this view does not seem conclusively right. At
some point, differences in degree become differences in
kind. There is a moral difference between swiping the
spare change and cleaning out the account. Moreover,
differences in degree may be rough proxies for more
elusive differences in kind. It is plausible to maintain
that the drug importer dealing in large quantities of
narcotics is a more harmful or evil figure than the
low-level retail salesman employed by his organization. This is a more complex difference than simply
one of quantity, but (at least when measured in single
transactions rather than in cumulative sales) a quantitative measure may capture the distinction pretty
well in the average case. 1 Quantitative distinctions,
thus, will sometimes be appropriate subjects for the
penal code, depending on why we think they are relelevels based on amount), 2D1.1(c) (drug quantity table, 17 different
levels based on type/amount of drug), 2F1.1(b) (fraud table, 19 levels
based on amount of loss caused by fraud), 2T4.1 (tax table, 21 levels
based on revenue loss).
71. Of course, where we decide to use quantitative distinctions as
proxies, we should be careful to consider whether a more direct definition of the distinction we think morally relevant is practicable. And we
should be far more careful than the federal guidelines are to insure
that cumulating the quantities involved in a series of petty transactions does not lead to a confusion of the serious violator with the repetitive petty offender. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 47 F.3d 60 (2d
Cir. 1995).
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vant, and how important they are to defining moral
categories.
The examples set forth above are perhaps so traditional or straightforward that I will appear to be
belaboring the obvious. But an examination of some
more controversial or unsettled issues confirms the
importance of the penal code as an arena for moral
definition. Take, for example, the question of "bias
crimes." Should we create a special, aggravated category of crime for offenses motivated by bias?
The fierce political controversy over this issue
seems to me almost entirely about the importance of
criminal law as a definer of moral values. There is almost certainly no need to increase the statutory
maximum penalty for any category of crime to provide
sufficient punishment for bias attackers. In the present harsh penal climate, statutory maximum penalties
for just about all crimes are high enough to accommodate appropriate punishment for the most aggravated
examples of each statutory offense. It is likely, moreover, that in any jurisdiction where community values
could generate the political momentum necessary to
pass such a statute, the same values would make it
extremely likely that discriminatory motivations
would be counted by most judges or by sentencing
commissioners as significant aggravating circumstances.
Nevertheless, proponents of a special crime for
bias attacks seek explicit political recognition that our
society condemns, as a special species of unacceptable
behavior, singling out a victim for the infliction of
harm on the basis of criteria that deny that person's
equality because of some group characteristic.72 Inclu72. Whether or not creation of a separate offense of this kind is desirable, I have never quite grasped the argument that doing so is con-

stitutionally problematic. Our civil rights laws are premised on the
moral view that it is wrong to deny a person certain benefits Gobs,
housing, etc.) based on that person's membership in a disfavored group.

Whether or not it wolud be wise to do so, it surely would not violate ei-
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sion of biased motivation as a sentencing factor does
not have quite the same significance, in this regard,
as a proclamation of social value. From the standpoint
of punishment, we may arrive at the same sentence
whether we regard a racially-motivated assault as a
violation of the victim's general right to bodily security, aggravated by the attacker's motive, or as a violation of the victim's right to equal respect, aggravated
by a physical assault. But the recognition of the right
to equal respect as a separate subject of protection of
the ordinary criminal law can really only be accomplished by identifying the violation as a crime. Inclusion of bias motivation as a sentencing factor, indeed,
need not reflect a moral evaluation of the act at all,
but could be premised on such utilitarian considerations as the likelihood of recidivism or the fear caused
in the community in such cases. For these reasons, or
because of the lesser visibility of sentencing determinations, use of bias as a sentencing factor seems to be,
as a practical matter, less controversial than the enactment of separate bias-crime penal statutes."
ther the First Amendment or the principle against punishing thoughtcrimes to impose criminal sanctions on willful violators of these laws. If
singling out someone black (or Jewish, or gay) for firing imposes a
moral harm that is recognizable in law, I don't understand why singling out a person for assault or property vandalism that is already
criminal doesn't impose two separate harms, which can appropriately
be punished cumulatively. In any case, the argument in the text does
not turn on whether bias crime statutes are desirable or even constitutional, but is limited to the significance of creating separate statutes of
this kind as opposed to treating biased motivation as an aggravating
sentencing factor, assuming arguendo that the factor is a desirable or
at least permissible moral consideration in punishment.
73. Interestingly enough, due to the vagaries of federal jurisdiction,
current federal law in effect treats bias crimes both as a separate category of crime and as an aggravator of other crimes. Specific statutes
penalize at least some bias assaults that are designed to interfere with
a victim's civil rights, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 242, 245 (West 1969 &
Supp. 1998), and the sentencing guidelines applicable to those offenses,
while recognizing an intrinsic harm to the civil rights violation itself,
aggravate the penalty depending on the (physical) seriousness of the
act. U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1. The sentencing guidelines also, however, provide
for an aggravation of any offense where the victim was selected because
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Once again, my point is not to resolve these issues, or to claim that there is a single correct answer
that courts could impose by striking down statutes
that shift morally significant distinctions that ought
to be in the penal code into the sentencing stage. My
intention rather is to illuminate some of the reasons
that could be considered by a conscientious drafter of
penal laws in determining the appropriate breadth of
definitions of crime. The definition of our moral standards seems to me an important function of penal
codes, and important moral distinctions should be
made in the code, and not in mere sentencing regulations.
B. Punishment

It is perhaps equally obvious, and is closely related to the previous point, that a factor relevant to
punishment should be included in the penal code,
rather than relegated to sentencing guidelines or left
to individual discretion, as the punitive consequences
attributable to that factor increase. Penal codes in the
era of indeterminate sentencing tended to recognize
the importance of punishment by specifying different
maximum prison terms for different crimes. Since the
actual time to be served would primarily depend on
judgments of character and reformation made by the
sentencing judges and parole authorities, and would
be based on a wide variety of factors not limited to
those bearing on the seriousness of the offense, there
was little need to subdivide degrees of crime based on
anything other than the maximum punishment allowed.
The advent of more nuanced, more retributionist
sentencing schemes changes that calculus. Where the
legislature has decreed not merely a maximum punishment, but also a mandatory minimum term of imof race, religion, or other protected characteristics. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(a).
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prisonment, the result has most often, appropriately
enough, been a subdivision of crimes into separate
categories defined by the factors that make the mandatory minimum, as well as any increased maximum
penalty, available.
What has been less clearly recognized is that the
imposition of discretion-limiting guideline regimes
also calls for some revision in the content of penal
codes. Once the legislature has decided to limit judicial sentencing discretion by creating a system of
guidelines that ties particular increments of punishment to specific facts, it has, through the medium of
the sentencing commission, created a de facto series of
subclasses of crimes.
As noted above, I do not regard this in itself as
problematic. But my argument for the acceptability of
this kind of regulation is based on a judgment about
proportion and degree. The use of administrative sentencing commissions raises separation of powers concerns, both for the potential delegation of the hardest
core of the legislative function-the definition of
crimes-to an agency, and for the possible usurpation
of a traditional judicial function-imposing judgment
in particular cases-by the legislature and its administrative creature. The line between individual judgment and general definition is neither hard-and-fast
nor easy to draw. In general, however, it makes good
sense, as well as good constitutional law, to assume
that the legislature ought to determine the basic parameters of punishment, and that the function of the
sentencing commission is to impose some uniformity
on the more detailed exercises in judgment that are
essentially left to the case-by-case decisions ofjudges.
This understanding only makes sense, however, if
the basic punitive decisions are made by the legislature, and the commission's role is seen as assessing
the significance of factors that can plausibly be regarded as details. Where legislative definitions of
crime are excessively vague, and the sentencing
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authority is left to create sub-categories with dramatically different consequences, something has gone
awry.
The federal guidelines can be tested against this
principle. Of course, the chaos of the crime definitions
and penalty provisions of the federal "code" put the
entire exercise of guideline creation at odds with my
principle as ideally conceived, because it was left to
the Sentencing Commission to decide the basic punishment level for most offenses with very little guidance from Congress. Since the penalty provisions of
federal criminal legislation create a hodgepodge of
penalties that are often out of proportion to each
other, the Commission was left to set the basic levels
of punishment based on its own conception of what
was appropriate, guided (to the extent it chose to be)
by the existing pattern of punishments imposed by the
courts.
A concrete example will make the point clearer.
The assault guidelines set basic offense levels of 6 and
15 (for a first offender, 0-6 months and 18-24 months
respectively) for "minor" and "aggravated" assault.74
These categories are not defined by any statute, and
apply across a considerable variety of separate criminal statutes with varying statutory maximum penalty
terms. This is an example of the federal penal code's
fundamental inconsistency with my preferred principle; the legislature has not determined the basic categories of culpability and the basic ranges of punishment.
Once the basic punishment levels are set, however, for most offenses the specific aggravating and
mitigating circumstances vary the base amounts by a
relatively small proportion. In other words, the basic
level of punishment is determined by whether the offender fits a category determined by the legislature (or
that should be determined by the legislature in a well74. U.S.S.G. §§ 2A2.2 and 2A2.3.
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or down from that base are fairly seen as matters of
detail.
Taking the "aggravated assault" guideline as an
example, the adjustments made for more specific sentencing factors add two through six levels to the base
offense level of 15. These adjustments are hardly
trivial-a six-level addition doubles the minimum
guideline sentence for a first offender, from 18 to 37
months. Moreover, the additional factors can be cumulated (though the guideline places some limits on the
possible cumulation.)75 The assault guidelines seem to
me to approach the limit of what can fairly be regarded as appropriate aggravation of punishment by
sentencing guidelines within a basic framework set by
the legislature. In most cases, the basic punishment is
primarily determined by the basic offense category,
and the aggravation, while not insignificant, does not
radically alter the level of punishment assessed; in the
(presumably relatively few cases) in which the maximum aggravation is present, one could reasonably
question whether the Commission has not increased
the punishment to a level that is of a different order of
magnitude than the basic offense level. At this point,
one begins to question whether such dramatic differences of punishment should not be assessed and imposed as part of a more accountable political process.
In some cases, moreover, the guidelines go well
beyond what would seem desirable in this regard. The
basic fraud and larceny guidelines allow radically different punishments based on factors that have no
statutory basis. The base offense level for defendants
convicted of mail fraud is only 6, which permits a probationary sentence. Depending solely on the amount
of money involved in the fraud, however, the penalty
can be enhanced by as much as 18 levels (requiring a
prison term of 51-63 months), and a number of other
75. Id. § 2A2.2(b)(3).
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adjustments are available on other grounds. 6
Of course, under the prior regime of judicial discretion and indeterminate sentences, judges had the
power to impose sentences that varied far more than
these amounts, without even the accountability built
into the guidelines' explicit statements of the weights
being given to various factors. This discretion may
equally have been excessive; one beneficial effect of
guidelines systems has been to bring the kinds of sentencing decisions that were being made by judges out
of the closet and to make explicit that at least some of
these decisions involved the determination of which
aggravating or mitigating factors required major distinctions in punishment-a determination that certainly ought not be left to the varying individual perceptions of different judges, and one that has too
significant an impact on individual defendants to be
relegated to a second-string legislative body and a
second-class fact-finding process. So long as the sentencing process purported to be primarily about individualized treatment of offenders, the extent to which
differences in punishment were in fact allowed to turn
on retributionist determinations of appropriate levels
of punishment remained hidden, perhaps even from
the sentences themselves. (And, to the extent sentencing decisions really were based primarily on rehabilitationist/incapacitative
treatment
considerations,
broad sentencing discretion and widely disparate
treatment of offenders had a rationale that did not require narrow legislative classification of offenses). My
point here is not to argue for judicial discretion as
against guidelines (or vice versa), but rather to argue
that where dramatic punishment consequences are
76. See generally id. § 2F1.1 Theoretically, such additional adjustments relating solely to the nature of the fraudulent conduct (without
reference to generally-applicable enhancements like role in the offense
or vulnerable victim) could add ten additional levels, bringing the
maximum available sentencing range for fraud to 34 (151-188 months
imprisonment).
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made to turn on retributionist judgments about the
seriousness of misconduct, at some point the determination of the appropriate categories of punishment
should not be delegated. It is not responsible lawmaking to say: Some frauds should be punished by
probation and others by a decade in prison, based
solely on the seriousness of the conduct, and we'll
leave it to somebody else to figure out which are
which.
Once again, I do not mean to insist on any specific
limits to the amount or proportion of increased punishment that ought to call for legislative rather than
administrative judgment. My point is only that beyond some point the sheer quantity of a punitive enhancement independently calls for incorporation into
the penal code, and/or suggests that a difference in
the moral quality of the crime is being recognized.
C. ProceduralProtections

Of course, to the person being punished, it may
matter little whether the punishment being imposed
reflects a moral or a practical judgment, or whether
the provision requiring the punishment forms part of
a penal code or a sentencing guideline or even a
judge's individual sentencing philosophy. It does matter to that person, however, and crucially, what factfinding process, and what degree of certainty, are required before that punishment can be imposed. The
question of procedural fairness to the accused is
closely linked to the substantive question of the
amount of additional punishment that turns on the
particular sentencing factor.
Historically, the functional corollary of a factor's
inclusion in the penal code as part of the definition of
a crime has been the requirement that that fact be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction
of a jury after a trial under formal rules of evidence;
those facts that are "merely" factors bearing on the
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judge's discretionary sentencing authority (or the
application of administrative guidelines that substitute for or direct that discretion) need only be proved
by a preponderance of the evidence to the sentencing
judge, in a hearing at which the rules of evidence (and
even constitutional exclusionary rules) may not apply.
In one sense, then, the question of how much of a
moral difference, or how much of a difference in punishment, is necessary to call for placing a factor in the
definition of a crime rather than in a sentencing
guideline can be answered in procedural terms: when
the difference in moral stigma or in tangible punishment is so great that fairness requires the degree of
certainty associated with the traditional procedural
safeguards of the criminal process.
Once again, this is not a standard that the Supreme Court has felt comfortable applying as a matter
of constitutional law. Deference to the legislature's
line-drawing in such matters has been customary, and
is, for the most part, correct. Since the decision is ultimately one of degree and judgment, rather than of
clear conceptual distinction, the courts should generally defer to the political process.
It is not too much to expect, however, that legislatures and the commissions that advise them attempt
to apply this standard in good faith. In the ad hoc,
session-by-session law-making process, with the political winds blowing in favor of whatever legislation
promises to lock up the most defendants the fastest,
the pressures to create rules that minimize the burden
of proof or short-cut time-consuming and expensive
jury trials may be irresistible. Any given incursion on
traditional divisions of authority between judge and
jury or legislature and judiciary may be read simply
as a desirable "get-tough-on-crime" measure. But that
dynamic forms an important part of the justification
for periodic comprehensive penal code reform, that attempts to put order into the random, politically expedient, and sometimes ill-advised innovations in crimi-
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nal law that develop over time, especially in times
when the fear of crime governs the process. A second,
principled look at such innovations will often reveal
them to have been compromises of principle, not even
for genuine expediency but for mere gestures in the
direction of severity.
However useful such a new look at our penal
codes generally might be, there is a particular need for
review at the federal level. Since the failure of the
comprehensive federal penal code reform proposed by
the Brown Commission, there has been an explosion
of federal criminal law, a revolution in sentencing
procedure, and a host of innovative new criminal statutes and forms of procedure. But among the many urgent reasons why a reformed federal code may be in
order, a clearer and more principled division between
those classifications of crime that ought to be incorporated in a code and those that can be left to the sentencing process is especially significant. To revert to
the example of the assault guidelines, the critical punitive distinctions between aggravated and minor assault that determine dramatic differences in the basic
punishment for the crime need not be established before a jury at trial or proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, because legally they are treated as sentencing
factors.77 Similarly, the dramatic differences in punishment that the fraud guidelines permit between minor and aggravated instances of fraud turn on factual
findings that a jury has not made.7" Indeed, it has
been held that even factors that are enacted by Congress, and that support the imposition of mandatory
minimum sentences under the narcotics laws, are
merely sentencing factors rather than elements of the
offense to be proved at trial.79 Whether or not the Supreme Court upholds such incursions into traditional
criminal procedure as permissible under the Consti77. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2A 2.2, 2A 2.3.
78. See id. § 2F 1.1.
79. See, e.g., DeSimone, 119 F.3d at 217.
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tution, and whether or not these decisions represent a
correct interpretation of the existing controlled substances laws, I would submit that relegating facts that
result in dramatic differences in actual punishment,
or that require imposition of a substantial mandatory
minimum sentence, to a non-jury fact-finding process,
is an abuse of the sensible distinction between offense
elements and sentencing factors. As a matter of procedural fairness, factual determinations that carry such
extreme consequences for defendants ought properly
to be made based on the more stringent procedures
that commonly are provided for offense elements and
not provided in the case of sentencing factors.8"
This, once again, is primarily a political judgment
(albeit one with due process overtones), over which
disagreement is certainly possible. But two propositions that are implicated in that judgment are not, I
think, fairly debatable. First, the nature of the factfinding process to be applied in each case is a centrally-relevant factor in determining which elements
that bear on punishment should be treated as part of
the definition of the offense. And second, in many of
the cases we've been discussing, especially on the fed80. For this reason, the Supreme Courts recent decision in Almendarez-Torres, 118 S. Ct 1219, is deeply regrettable. In AlmendarezTorres, the Court interpreted a statute that increased the maximum
penalty for re-entry after deportation from two years to twenty years
where the initial deportation followed conviction for an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1326 (b)(2) (West 1970 & Supp. 1998). The Court
decided that Congress intended the "aggravated felony" element to be
treated as a mere "sentencing element," rather than constituting the
distinguishing element of a separate crime, and consequently that its
presence or absence can be determined at sentencing. I think the Court
was terribly wrong to conclude, absent crystal clear instructions from
Congress, that the legislature intended to turn a tenfold increase in the
statutorily-mandated maximum sentence on a factor that need not be
proved beyond reasonable doubt to a jury. Under the principles advanced in this essay, Congress clearly should treat such a dramatic
sentencing consequence as an offense element, and the Court should
have presumed that Congress so intended, absent a completely unambiguous expression of contrary intent. See id. at 1233 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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eral level, there has never been a genuine legislative
effort to determine, systematically and consistently,
how the line between offense elements and sentencing
factors should be drawn.
D. The Role of the Legislature
This last observation brings me to my final point.
One critical, and often-overlooked, issue in determining what factors should be treated as offense elements
derives from notions of institutional role. (I would be
inclined to use the term "separation of powers" here,
but I do not necessarily mean to imply a binding constitutional principle). In the modern American tradition, where common law crimes have been all-but unheard of, defining the elements of crimes has been a
function for the legislature. No one would suggest that
the courts, or a sentencing commission, have the
power to redefine the elements of offenses that have
been defined by the legislature. The micromanagement of sentencing, on the other hand, has
been seen as a judicial function.
As noted earlier, I tend to believe that there are
good reasons for preserving significant sentencing discretion for judges, and my own inclination would be to
soften the constraints of guideline sentencing regimes.
But in defining sentencing as a judicial function, I
don't mean to foreclose, as a matter of principle, even
a very detailed administrative sentencing code like
the federal guidelines. The professed purpose of the
guideline system is to reduce disparity in sentencing
among individual judges, and not to transfer control of
the details of sentencing from the judicial branch to
the legislature. (Indeed, the Sentencing Reform Act
provides that the United States Sentencing Commission is located "in the judicial branch" of government 8
-in symbolic (not "merely" symbolic) recognition of
81. 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(a) (West 1993 and Supp. 1998).
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this very point).
Whether sentencing decisions are left to individual judges' discretion or guided, to a greater or lesser
degree, by some form of regulation, there remains a
significant distinction between the kinds of penal policy questions that ought to be decided by the legislature and the ones that are appropriately left to a different level of authority. Some things ought to be
decided by the legislature, at a high level of generality, visibility and accountability; other matters ought
not be decided by the legislature, because they descend to a level of individualization, refinement and
implementation that is best not addressed in terms of
a political process. The legislature defines crimes,
but-to take the extreme instance of the judicial
function-it may not pass bills of attainder mandating
the punishment to be imposed in individual cases. For
similar reasons, legislative micro-management of sentencing is not a good idea; such matters are not typically issues of broad political principle, but of the detailed application of general rules to particular cases.
As a constitutional principle, this division of
functions can only be policed at the extremes. The
legislature surely has the power to pass a code resembling the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, rather
than to delegate that task to an administrative or judicial agency. Notably, however, Congress did not do
that, and no legislature would be likely to do so. The
task is too complex, and requires too much routine
monitoring and revision, to be effectively performed by
a legislative body. Because the Sentencing Commission is, in principle, constantly reviewing every individual sentence imposed by a judge, and in turn refining its own rules to further guide the judges' task, its
work is more closely associated with the judicial than
with the legislative function. And this is the more so,
the more the Commission attempts to control judicial
discretion by regulating in greater detail.
Even an advocate of such close control of the ju-
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dicial function must recognize that this kind of control
is ultimately administrative and implementational in
nature. As the level of sentencing detail rises, the
ability of the legislature to monitor the regulations decreases, and legislative interventions come closer and
closer to dictating results in particular cases. The
value of an independent judiciary in applying politically-determined principles in a neutral way to individual cases may survive a sentencing commission
that tries to impose consistency on the actions of hundreds of individual judicial officers, but it will be more
deeply threatened when political forces choose to
tinker on an ad hoc basis with the minutiae of sentencing.
This analysis suggests a broad political rule of
thumb: if a policy decision is important enough to be
specifically addressed by the legislature, it presumably should be treated as an element of the offense,
rather than as a sentencing factor. Such decisions
ought not be fobbed off to a less accountable, less
visible agency, or left to the varied opinions of individual judges. Both implicit and explicit in the arguments above is the proposition that determining society's fundamental moral values, and determining at
least the larger parameters of the imposition of serious punishment on offenders, are matters for determination in a political forum, based on open and serious debate. To leave these critical decisions to judges
was wrong-not because it allowed too much judicial
discretion over sentencing but because it potentially
left the wrong kinds of issues to the courts. It is one
thing to leave to judges a determination of how much
incarceration is necessary to rehabilitate an individual offender, if the legislature determines that rehabilitation of offenders is the principal goal of criminal
law. It is quite another thing to allow judges to decide
each for her- or himself whether drug selling is more
serious than defense contract fraud or vice versa.
Leaving such issues to judges would be wrong even if
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all the judges agreed, so that no sentencing disparity
resulted. Nor would the problem be avoided by leaving
the decision to a commission of judges (or others), who
could impose their views on all their colleagues.
Making these determinations is precisely what we pay
legislators to do, and they should do it.
The converse rule seems equally valid: the legislature ought to resist the temptation to issue specific
directives to the sentencing agency, for reasons similar to, though less strong than, the reasons it is not
permitted to direct judges as to the sentences to be
imposed in a particular case. If a factor is sufficiently
important for the legislature to address its sentencing
significance in legislation, it presumably belongs in
the code, to mark a major moral category and be addressed by jurors at trial. But if a factor is sufficiently
minor to be left to sentencing-phase judicial resolution, its precise impact on sentencing should be left for
determination by the judges, or by the sentencing
commission.
These standards again may not be susceptible to
intellectually pure application, or to judicial enforcement as a matter of separation of powers. But it is
reasonably clear that Congress has failed this test,
too. If the courts are to be believed, Congress has written into law mandatory minimum sentencing provisions that it has not intended to treat as elements of
separate offenses, but simply as sentencing instructions.82 And Congress has enacted specific directives to
82. See note 79 and accompanying text above. I myself am not per-

suaded that Congress did any such thing; the statutory language does
not, in my opinion, clearly indicate that Congress was affirmatively directing that the mandatory minimum amounts be determined by judge
or by jury, and a fair reading of the statutes should pay more regard to
the tradition of legislative division of crime into degrees that constitute
separate crimes each of whose elements are to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It is by no means clear that Congress' choice to include

the narcotic amounts requiring mandatory minimum sentences in the
subsection concerning "penalties" rather than in that denominated
"prohibited acts" constitutes a conscious legislative determination regarding the appropriate fact-finder and standard of proof for these is-
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the Sentencing Commission to tinker with its guidelines in quite specific ways, in response to perceived
political demands.83 On the other hand, Congress has
been content to allow the Commission in effect to superimpose on the uneven quilt of statutory definitions
a virtual penal code of its own, making fundamental
distinctions and classifications that Congress has not
seen fit to write into statutory law.
But this dismal record should not persuade us
that Congress cannot do better. Already by the 1960s,
the piecemeal nature of criminal legislation had necessitated a systematic review of federal criminal law.
Since that time, fundamental changes in our conception of sentencing law-as well as an unusually active
period of ad hoc criminal legislation occasioned by
public concern about crime-have both further disrupted the consistency of federal law and deprived the
primary model for penal code reform of much of its
utility as a guide to reform. A systematic revision of
federal criminal law today would require a new look
at the proper division of authority between Congress
and the Sentencing Commission, just as a more generally-applicable Model Penal Code 2d would need to
revisit fundamental questions of the special part of
the criminal law in light of changed sentencing philosophies.
It is, in the end, fundamentally up to the legislature to determine what our values are, what basic
punishments should apply to violations of those valsues. See also note 80.
83. See U.S.S.G., app. B, at 485-501 (reproducing editorial notes
following 28 U.S.C.A. § 994 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998)) for a collection
of approximately fifty congressional directives to the sentencing commission. Some of these give general directions to the Commission to
provide appropriate adjustments for particular purposes, but others
even more inappropriately direct the Commission to make specific
changes to particular penalty levels. See, e.g., Sex Crimes Against
Children Prevention Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-71, §2, 109 Stat. 774, 774
(1995) (Commission directed to "increase the base offense level for an
offense under [18 U.S.C.A. § 2251] by at least two levels").
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ues, and when the consequences of the classifications
thus drawn are sufficiently significant that only the
traditional procedural protections of the criminal
process are sufficient to determine where an offender
falls within them. These are questions that are hard
to address, however, in the absence of a comprehensive examination of criminal law. The potential for recalling the legislature to this fundamental role is an
important potential benefit of a project to create a
Model Penal Code, Second (and/or a Model Federal
Penal Code.)
VI.

CONCLUSION

While the "general part" of the Model Penal Code
has stood up well to the passage of time, the "special
part" is in need of serious re-thinking before it could
serve as a model for a legislature-and still more so
for Congress-today. This is partly because of the
considerable creative effort of legislatures since 1962,
but is principally the result of a dramatic change since
that time in sentencing philosophy. That change not
only rejects the philosophy underlying the sentencing
article of the Model Penal Code itself, but also undermines the assumptions behind its substantive
definitions of crimes.
A legislature that seeks to control judicial sentencing discretion and mandate "just deserts" sentencing through a combination of mandatory minimum
sentences, abolition of parole, and sentencing guidelines needs to devote serious attention to questions
the drafters of the Model Penal Code never had to address. In particular the division of responsibility between the legislature and the sentencing commission
in defining the factors differentiating offenses, and between the trial (jury) and sentencing (judge) processes
in determining the presence of those factors in particular cases, are questions that cannot be ignored in
the drafting of a penal code consistent with the domi-
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nant sentencing philosophy of the present moment.
I have argued in this essay that factors that are
thought to mark a significant moral distinction between categories of conduct, and/or that determine
significant increases in punishment, ought to be defined by the legislature, written into the penal code as
elements of distinct offenses, and proved at trial beyond a reasonable doubt. Less significant sentencing
factors, on the other hand, not only can but should be
left to the sentencing commission or to the discretion
of individual judges, and should not be micromanaged
by the legislature.
These are rough common-sensical distinctions. No
doubt, additional thought and research can refine
them further. But the project is an important one.
Moreover, it is increasingly urgent. As the example of
federal criminal law shows, ad hoc imposition of the
sentencing rules of the late twentieth century on a set
of penal statutes drafted on the assumption of an entirely different sentencing philosophy leads to procedural unfairness, blurs the functions of the different
branches of government, and produces unjust results
in particular cases.
There may be little practical need for revisiting
the principal contribution of the Model Penal Codeits organization and rationalization of the general
part of Anglo-American criminal law. That is perhaps
to be expected; the general part deals with questions
that are, if not eternal, at least for the ages, and the
Code's effort to resolve those questions was sufficiently successful that a mere 35 years is unlikely to
have revolutionized our understanding of them. But
the special part of a criminal code is more transitory,
responding to the perceived threats to public order of
a particular time, and our time has been one especially worried about crime. A Model Penal Code 2d, or
a Model Federal Code, written for the early 21st century, would have to take a very different approach to
the special part.

